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BLOTTO GAMES WITH COSTLY WINNINGS
IRIT NOWIK AND TAHL NOWIK
Abstract. We introduce a new variation of them-player asymmetric Colonel Blotto
game, where the n battles occur as sequential stages of the game, and the winner of
each stage needs to spend resources for maintaining his win. The limited resources
of the players are thus needed both for increasing the probability of winning and for
the maintenance costs. We show that if the initial resources of the players are not
too small, then the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, and the given equilibrium
strategies guarantee the given expected payoff for each player.
1. Introduction
We present a new n-stage game, which is a variation of the Colonel Blotto game.
Each player starts the game with some given resource, and at the beginning of each
stage he must decide how much resource to invest in that stage. A player wins the
given stage with probability corresponding to the relative investments of the players,
and if all players invest 0 then no player wins that stage. The winner of the stage
receives a payoff which may differ from stage to stage. Since it is possible that certain
stages will not be won by any player, this is not a fixed sum game.
The players’ resources from which the investments are taken can be thought of as
money, whereas the payoffs should be thought of as a quantity of different nature, such
as political gain. The two quantities cannot be interchanged, that is, the payoff cannot
be converted into resources for further investment.
The new feature of our game is the following. The winner of each stage is required
to spend additional resources on the maintenance of his winning. This is a real life
situation, where the winnings are some assets, and resources are required for their
maintenance, as in wars, territorial contests among organisms, or in the political arena.
The winner of a given stage must put aside all resources that will be required for future
maintenance costs of the won asset. Thus, a fixed amount will be deducted from the
Date: March 3, 2016.
1
2 IRIT NOWIK AND TAHL NOWIK
resources of the winner immediately after winning, which should be thought of as the
sum of all future maintenance costs for the given acquired asset.
At each stage the player thus needs to decide how much to invest in the given
stage, where winning that stage on one hand leads to the payoff of the given stage,
but on the other hand the maintenance cost for the given winning negatively affects
the probabilities for future winnings. In the present work we show that if the initial
resources of the players are not too small then the game has a unique Nash equilibrium,
and each player guarantees the payoff of this Nash equilibrium (Theorem 3.5 for two
players and Theorem 4.1 for m players.)
As mentioned, our game presents a variation of the well known Colonel Blotto game
([B]). In Blotto games two players simultaneously distribute forces across several bat-
tlefields. At each battlefield, the player that allocates the largest force wins. The
Blotto game has been developed and generalized in many directions (see e.g., [B], [F],
[L], [R], [H], [DM]). Two main developments are the “asymmetric” and the “stochas-
tic” models. The asymmetric version allows the payoffs of the battlefields to differ from
each other, and in the stochastic model the deterministic rule deciding on the winner is
replaced by a probabilistic one, by which the chances of winning a battlefield depends
on the size of investment.
The present work adds a new feature which changes the nature of the game, in
making the winnings costly. The players thus do not know before hand how much of
their resources will be available for investing in winning rather than on maintenance,
and so the game cannot be formulated with simultaneous investments, as in the usual
Blotto games, but rather must be formulated with sequential stages. At each stage the
players need to decide how much to invest in the given stage, based on their remaining
available resources and on the future fees and payoffs.
This work was inspired by previous work of the first author with S. Zamir and I.
Segev ([N],[NZS]) on a developmental competition that occurs in the nervous system,
which we now describe. A muscle is composed of many muscle-fibers. At birth each
muscle-fiber is innervated by several motor-neurons (MNs) that “compete” to singly
innervate it. It has been found that MNs with higher activation-threshold win in
more competitions than MNs with lower activation thresholds. In [N] this competitive
BLOTTO GAMES WITH COSTLY WINNINGS 3
process is modeled as a multi-stage game between two groups of players: those with
lower and those with higher thresholds. At each stage a competition at the most active
muscle-fiber is resolved. The strategy of a group is defined as the average activity level
of its members and the payoff is defined as the sum of their wins. If a MN wins (i.e.,
singly innervates) a muscle-fiber, then from that stage on, it must continually devote
resources for maintaining this muscle-fiber. Hence the MNs use their resources both
for winning competitions and for maintaining previously acquired muscle-fibers. It is
proved in [N] that in such circumstances it is advantageous to win in later competitions
rather than in earlier ones, since winning at a late stage will encounter less maintenance
and thus will negatively affect only the few competitions that were not yet resolved. If
µ is the cost of maintaining a win at each subsequent stage, then in the terminology
of the present work, the fee payed by the MNs for winning the kth stage of an n stage
game is (n− k)µ.
We start by analyzing the 2-person game in Sections 2 and 3, and then generalize to
the m-person setting in Section 4.
2. The 2-person game
The initial data for the 2-person version of our game is the following.
(1) The number n of stages of the game.
(2) Fixed payoffs wk > 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, to be received by the winner of the kth stage.
(3) The initial resources A,B ≥ 0 of players I,II respectively.
(4) Fixed fees ck ≥ 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, to be deducted from the resources of the
winner after the kth stage.
The rules of the game are as follows. At the kth stage of the game, the two players,
which we name PI,PII, each has some remaining resource Ak, Bk, where A1 = A,B1 =
B. PI,PII each needs to decide his investment xk, yk for that stage, respectively, with
0 ≤ xk ≤ Ak − ck, 0 ≤ yk ≤ Bk − ck, and where if Ak < ck then PI may only invest 0,
and similarly for PII. These rules ensure that the winner of the given stage will have
the resources for paying the given fee ck. The probability for PI,PII of winning this
stage is respectively xk
xk+yk
and yk
xk+yk
, where if xk = yk = 0 then no player wins. The
resource of the winner of the kth stage is then reduced by an additional ck, that is,
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if PI wins the kth stage then Ak+1 = Ak − xk − ck and Bk+1 = Bk − yk, and if PII
wins then Ak+1 = Ak − xk and Bk+1 = Bk − yk − ck. The role of ck is in determining
Ak+1, Bk+1, thus there is no cn. It will however be convenient in the sequel to formally
define cn = 0. The payoff received by the winner of the kth stage is wk. Since it is
possible that no player wins certain stages, this game is not a fixed sum game.
As already mentioned, the resource quantities Ak, Bk, xk, yk, ck used for the invest-
ments and fees are of different nature than that of the payoffs wk. The two quantities
cannot be interchanged and should be thought of as having different “units”. Note
that all expressions below are unit consistent, that is, if say we divide resources by
payoff, then such expression has units of resources
payoff
, and may only be added or equated
to expressions of the same units.
If A and B are too small in comparison to c1, . . . , cn−1 then the players’ strategies are
strongly influenced by the possibility of running out of resources before the end of the
game. In the present work we analyze the game when A,B are not too small. Namely,
we introduce a quantity M depending on c1, . . . , cn−1 and w1, . . . , wn, and prove that
if A,B > M then there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the game, and each player
guarantees the value of this Nash equilibrium.
For k = 1, . . . , n let Wk =
∑n
i=k wi and W =W1. We now show that if A > M , then
if PI always chooses to invest xk ≤
wk
Wk
Ak (as holds for our strategy σn,A,B presented
in Definition 3.1 below), then whatever the random outcomes of the game are, his
resources will not run out before the end of the game. We in fact give a specific lower
bound on Ak for every k, which will be used repeatedly in the sequel.
Proposition 2.1. Let
M =W · max
1≤k≤n
(
ck
wk
+
k−1∑
i=1
ci
Wi+1
)
.
If A > M , and if PI plays xk ≤
wkAk
Wk
for all k, then Ak >
Wkck
wk
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In
particular Ak > 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. And similarly for PII.
Proof. For every 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have A
W
> M
W
≥ ck
wk
+
∑k−1
i=1
ci
Wi+1
, so
A
W
−
k−1∑
i=1
ci
Wi+1
>
ck
wk
.
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Thus it is enough to show that Ak
Wk
≥ A
W
−
∑k−1
i=1
ci
Wi+1
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We show this
by induction on k. For k = 1 the sum is empty and we get equality. Assuming
Ak
Wk
≥
A
W
−
k−1∑
i=1
ci
Wi+1
we get
Ak+1
Wk+1
≥
1
Wk+1
(
Ak −
wkAk
Wk
− ck
)
=
1
Wk+1
(Wk+1Ak
Wk
− ck
)
=
Ak
Wk
−
ck
Wk+1
≥
A
W
−
k−1∑
i=1
ci
Wi+1
−
ck
Wk+1
=
A
W
−
k∑
i=1
ci
Wi+1
.

We consider two simple examples of c1, . . . , cn−1, w1, . . . , wn, for which M may be
readily identified.
(1) Let ck = n − k, wk = 1 for all k. These fees and payoffs are as in the
biological game described in the introduction. For every 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have
n
(
ck +
∑k−1
i=1
ci
n−i
)
= n
(
(n− k) + (k − 1)
)
= n(n− 1), so M = n(n− 1).
(2) Let ck = 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, wk = 1 for all k. Using the inequality
∑n
k=1
1
k
<
1 + lnn, we get for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n that n
(
ck +
∑k−1
i=1
ci
n−i
)
< n(2 + lnn), so
M < n(2 + lnn).
We note that an obvious necessary condition for A to satisfy Proposition 2.1 is
A ≥
∑n−1
k=1 ck, since in case PI wins all stages he will need to pay all fees ck. We see
thatM in the two examples above is not much larger. Namely, in (1),
∑n−1
k=1 ck =
n(n−1)
2
and M = n(n− 1), and in (2),
∑n−1
k=1 ck = n− 1 and M < n(2 + lnn).
3. Nash equilibrium
We define the following two strategies σn,A,B and τn,A,B for PI,PII respectively. We
prove that for A,B > M as given in Proposition 2.1, this pair of strategies is a unique
Nash equilibrium, and these strategies guarantee the given payoffs.
Definition 3.1. At the kth stage of the game, let
ak =
wkAk
Wk
−
Akck
Ak +Bk
and bk =
wkBk
Wk
−
Bkck
Ak +Bk
.
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where as mentioned, we formally define cn = 0. The strategy σn,A,B for PI is the
following: At the kth stage PI invests ak if it is allowed by the rules of the game.
Otherwise he invest 0. The strategy τn,A,B for PII is similarly defined with bk.
Recall that ak 6= 0 is allowed by the rules of the game if 0 ≤ ak ≤ Ak − ck, whereas
ak = 0 is always allowed, even when Ak − ck < 0. We interpret the quantities ak, bk as
follows. PI first divides his remaining resource Ak to the remaining stages in proportion
to the payoff for each remaining stage, which gives wk
Wk
Ak. From this he subtracts
Ak
Ak+Bk
ck which is the expected fee he will pay for this stage, since
ak
ak+bk
= Ak
Ak+Bk
. Note
that Wn = wn and formally cn = 0, so an = An, bn = Bn, i.e. at the last stage the
two players invest all their remaining resources.
Depending on A and B and on the random outcomes of the game, it may be that PI
indeed reaches a stage where ak is not allowed. In this regard we make the following
definition.
Definition 3.2. The triple (n,A,B) is PI-effective if when PI and PII use σn,A,B and
τn,A,B, then it is impossible that they reach a stage where ak is not allowed for PI.
Similarly PII-effectiveness is defined for PII with bk.
Proposition 3.3. Let M be as in Proposition 2.1. If A > M and B is arbitrary, then
(n,A,B) is PI-effective. Furthermore, ak > 0 for all k. And similarly for PII when
B > M .
Proof. We need to show that necessarily 0 < ak ≤ Ak − ck for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We have
ak =
wkAk
Wk
− Akck
Ak+Bk
≤ wkAk
Wk
, so by Proposition 2.1, wk
Wk
> ck
Ak
≥ ck
Ak+Bk
and Ak > 0, so
wkAk
Wk
> Akck
Ak+Bk
giving ak > 0.
For the inequality ak ≤ Ak − ck we first consider k ≤ n− 1. We have from the proof
of Proposition 2.1 that Ak
Wk
− ck
Wk+1
≥ A
W
−
∑k
i=1
ci
Wi+1
>
ck+1
wk+1
≥ 0, so Ak
Wk
> ck
Wk+1
, and so
(1−
Ak
Ak +Bk
)ck ≤ ck <
Wk+1Ak
Wk
= (1−
wk
Wk
)Ak.
This gives ck −
Akck
Ak+Bk
< Ak −
wkAk
Wk
, so ak =
wkAk
Wk
− Akck
Ak+Bk
< Ak − ck. For k = n we
note that cn = 0 by definition, and Wn = wn, so an = An = An − cn. 
In general, an inductive characterization of PI-effectiveness will also involve induction
regrading PII. But if we assume that B > M , and so by Proposition 3.3 all bk are known
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to be allowed and positive, then the notion of PI-effectiveness becomes simpler, and
may be characterized inductively as follows. When saying that a triple (n − 1, A′, B′)
is PI-effective, we refer to the n − 1 stage game with fees c2, . . . , cn−1 and payoffs
w2, . . . , wn. Starting with n = 1, (1, A, B) is always PI-effective. For n ≥ 2, if a1
is not allowed then (n,A,B) is not PI-effective. If a1 = 0 then it is allowed, and PI
surely loses the first stage, and so (n,A,B) is PI-effective iff (n− 1, A, B − b1 − c1) is
PI-effective. Finally if a1 > 0 and it is allowed then (n,A,B) is PI-effective iff both
(n− 1, A− a1 − c1, B − b1) and (n− 1, A− a1, B − b1 − c1) are PI-effective.
The crucial step in proving Theorem 3.5 below, on the unique Nash equilibrium and
the guaranteed payoffs, is the following Theorem 3.4. We point out that in Theorem 3.5
we will assume that A > M , in which case (n,A,B) is PI-effective, by Proposition 3.3.
But here in Theorem 3.4 we must consider arbitrary A ≥ 0 in order for an induction
argument to carry through.
Theorem 3.4. Given c1, . . . , cn−1 and w1, . . . , wn let M be as in Proposition 2.1, and
assume that B > M and PII plays the strategy τn,A,B. For A ≥ 0, if (n,A,B) is
PI-effective, and PI plays according to σn,A,B, then his expected payoff is
AW
A+B
. On the
other hand, if (n,A,B) is not PI-effective, or if PI uses a different strategy, then his
expected payoff is strictly less than AW
A+B
.
Proof. By induction on n. We note that throughout the present proof we do not use the
condition B > M directly, but rather only through the statements of Propositions 3.3
and 2.1 saying that (n,A,B) is PII-effective, bk > 0 and ck <
wkBk
Wk
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
which indeed continue to hold along the induction process.
If A = 0 then ak = 0 for all k, which is the only possible investment, and its payoff
is 0 = AW
A+B
, so the statement holds. We thus assume from now on that A > 0. For
n = 1 we have b1 = B. The allowed investment for PI is 0 ≤ s ≤ A with expected
payoff s
s+B
w1 =
s
s+B
W which indeed attains a strict maximum A
A+B
W at s = A = a1.
For n ≥ 2, let s be the investment of PI in the first stage. Assume first that
s = 0. In this case PII surely wins the first stage and so following this stage we have
A2 = A and B2 = B − b1 − c1. The moves for PII dictated by τn,A,B for the remaining
n − 1 stages of the game are τn−1,A,B−b1−c1, and so by the induction hypothesis the
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expected total payoff of PI is at most AW2
A+B−b1−c1
. Since Proposition 2.1 holds for
PII, we have c1 <
w1B
W
≤
w1(A+B)
W
, that is, w1
W
− c1
A+B
> 0, and since A > 0 we
get a1 = A(
w1
W
− c1
A+B
) > 0. This means that s = 0 6= a1, so we must verify the
strict inequality AW2
A+B−b1−c1
< AW
A+B
. This is readily verified, using A > 0, c1 <
w1B
W
,
W2 = W − w1, and b1 + c1 =
w1B
W
− Bc1
A+B
+ c1 =
w1B
W
+ Ac1
A+B
.
We now assume s > 0. This is allowed only if A > c1 and 0 < s ≤ A−c1. The moves
for PII dictated by τn,A,B for the remaining n − 1 stages of the game are τn−1,A2,B2 .
By the induction hypothesis, if PI wins the first stage, which happens with probability
s
s+b1
> 0, then his expected payoff in the remaining n − 1 stages of the game is at
most (A−s−c1)W2
A+B−s−b1−c1
. Similarly, if he loses the first stage, which happens with probability
b1
s+b1
> 0, then his expected payoff in the remaining n−1 stages is at most (A−s)W2
A+B−s−b1−c1
.
Thus, the expected payoff of PI for the whole n stage game is at most F (s), where
F (s) =
s
s+ b1
(
w1 +
(A− s− c1)W2
A +B − s− b1 − c1
)
+
b1
s+ b1
·
(A− s)W2
A+B − s− b1 − c1
with b1 =
w1B
W
− Bc1
A+B
.
By the induction hypothesis we know furthermore, that in case PI wins the first stage,
he will attain the maximal expected payoff (A−s−c1)W2
A+B−s−b1−c1
in the remaining stages of the
game only if (n−1, A−s−c1 , B−b1) is PI-effective, and he uses σn−1,A−s−c1,B−b1 . Sim-
ilarly, if he loses the first stage, he will attain the maximal expected payoff (A−s)W2
A+B−s−b1−c1
only if (n − 1, A − s, B − b1 − c1) is PI-effective and he uses σn−1,A−s,B−b1−c1. If not,
then since both alternatives occur with positive probability, his expected total payoff
for the whole n stage game will be strictly less than F (s).
To analyze F (s), we make a change of variable s = a1 + x, that is, we define
F̂ (x) = F (a1 + x) = F (
w1A
W
− Ac1
A+B
+ x). After some manipulations we get:
F̂ (x) =
AW
A+B
−
BW 3x2
(A+B)
(
W2(A+B)−Wx
)(
Wx−Wc1 + w1(A +B)
) .
Under this substitution, s = a1 corresponds to x = 0, and the allowed domain
0 < s ≤ A− c1 corresponds to
Ac1
A+B
−
w1A
W
< x ≤
W2A
W
−
Bc1
A+B
.
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Using c1 <
w1B
W
, one may verify that in the above expression for F̂ the two linear
factors appearing in the denominator of the second term are both strictly positive in
this domain. It follows that F̂ in the given domain is at most AW
A+B
, and this maximal
value is attained only for x = 0 (if it is in the domain), which corresponds to s = a1
for the original F . Finally, as mentioned, unless (n − 1, A2, B2) is PI-effective and PI
plays σn−1,A2,B2 , his expected payoff will be strictly less than F (s), and so strictly less
than AW
A+B
. 
We may now prove our main result.
Theorem 3.5. Given c1, . . . , cn−1 and w1, . . . , wn, let M be as in Proposition 2.1,
and assume A,B > M . Then the pair of strategies σn,A,B, τn,A,B is a unique Nash
equilibrium for the game, with expected total payoffs AW
A+B
, BW
A+B
. Furthermore, σn,A,B
and σn,A,B guarantee the expected payoffs
AW
A+B
and BW
A+B
.
Proof. Denote σ0 = σn,A,B and τ0 = τn,A,B, and for any pair of strategies σ, τ let
S1(σ, τ), S2(σ, τ) be the expected payoffs of PI, PII respectively. We first prove the
second statement of the theorem. Recall that if both players invest 0 in a given stage
then there is no winner to that stage. However, if B > M and PII plays τ0, then
by Proposition 3.3 we have bk > 0 for all k, and so indeed there is a winner to each
stage of the game, and thus the total combined payoff of PI and PII is necessarily W .
It thus follows from Theorem 3.4 that for any strategy σ of PI we have S2(σ, τ0) =
W − S1(σ, τ0) ≥
BW
A+B
. Similarly, if A > M then S1(σ0, τ) ≥
AW
A+B
for all τ , establishing
the second statement of the theorem.
As to the first statement, Theorem 3.4 applied to both PI and PII implies that the
pair σ0, τ0 is a Nash equilibrium with the given expected payoffs. To show it is unique
we argue as follows. Let σ, τ be any other Nash equilibrium and assume that σ 6= σ0. By
Theorem 3.4 we have S1(σ, τ0) < S1(σ0, τ0) and since playing τ0 guarantees a combined
total payoff of W , we have S2(σ, τ0) = W − S1(σ, τ0) > W − S1(σ0, τ0) = S2(σ0, τ0).
Since the pair σ, τ is a Nash equilibrium we also have S2(σ, τ) ≥ S2(σ, τ0), and together
we get S2(σ, τ) > S2(σ0, τ0). Since S1(σ, τ)+S2(σ, τ) ≤ W and S1(σ0, τ0)+S2(σ0, τ0) =
W , we must have S1(σ, τ) < S1(σ0, τ0). Again since σ, τ is a Nash equilibrium we
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have S1(σ0, τ) ≤ S1(σ, τ) so together S1(σ0, τ) < S1(σ0, τ0) =
AW
A+B
, contradicting the
conclusion of the previous paragraph. 
We remark that our Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect. This may be seen from
the inductive proof, and also follows from the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, since
the game is finite.
4. The m-person game
The generalization of our game and results to anm-person setting is straightforward.
Player Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, starts with resource A
i ≥ 0, and we are again given fixed
fees c1, . . . , cn−1 ≥ 0, and payoffs w1, . . . , wn > 0. At stage 1 ≤ k ≤ n player Pi
has remaining resource Aik, with A
i
1 = A
i. At stage k each player decides to invest
0 ≤ xik ≤ A
i
k − ck, or 0 if A
i
k < ck. The probability for Pi to win is
xi
k∑m
j=1 x
j
k
, and if
xik = 0 for all m then no player wins. The winner of the kth stage receives payoff wk
and pays the maintenance fee ck.
We define M as before, M =W ·max1≤k≤n
(
ck
wk
+
∑k−1
i=1
ci
Wi+1
)
.
The strategy σi
n,A1,...,Am
of Pi is the straightforward generalization of the strategies
σn,A,B, τn,A,B of the 2-person game, namely, at the kth stage Pi invests
aik =
wkA
i
k
Wk
−
Aikck∑m
j=1A
j
k
if it is allowed, and 0 otherwise.
The generalization of Theorem 3.5 is the following.
Theorem 4.1. If A1, . . . , Am > M then the m strategies σ1
n,A1,...,Am
, . . . , σm
n,A1,...,Am
are a unique Nash equilibrium for the m-person game, with expected total payoffs
A1W∑m
i=1 A
i , . . . ,
AmW∑m
i=1 A
i . Furthermore, σ
i
n,A1,...,Am guarantees the expected payoff
AiW∑m
j=1 A
j for
Pi.
Proof. We prove for P1. Let Bk =
∑m
i=2A
i
k and bk =
∑m
i=2 a
i
k. Since a
1
k =
wkA
1
k
Wk
−
A1
k
ck
A1
k
+Bk
and bk =
wkBk
Wk
− Bkck
A1
k
+Bk
, our player P1 can imagine that he is playing a 2-person game
against one joint player whose resource is Bk, and whose strategy dictates investing bk.
Thus the claim follows from Theorem 3.5. 
BLOTTO GAMES WITH COSTLY WINNINGS 11
References
[B] E. Borel: La theorie du jeu et les equations integrals a noyan symmetrique. C.R. Acad. Sci.
(1921) 173: 1304–1308. English translation by L. Savage. ”The theory of play and integral
equations with skew symmetric kernals”. Econometrica 21, (1953): 97-100.
[DM] J. Duffy, A. Matros: Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: Some new results. Economic
Letters (2015) 134: 4–8.
[F] L. Friedman: Game-theory models in the allocation of advertising expenditures. Operations
research (1958) 6 (5): 699–709.
[H] S. Hart: Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games. International Journal of Game
Theory (2008) 36: 441–460.
[L] M. Lake: A new campaign resource allocation model. In: Barms, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwodi-
auer, G. (Eds.) Applied Game theory. Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg, West Germany, Economic
Theory (1979) 118–132.
[N] I. Nowik: The game motoneurons play. Games and Economic Behavior (2009) 66: 426–461.
[NZS] I. Nowik, S. Zamir, I. Segev: Losing the battle but winning the war: game theoretic analysis
of the competition between motoneurons innervating a skeletal muscle. Frontiers in Compu-
tational neuroscience (2012) 6: Article 16.
[R] B. Roberson: The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory (2006) 29: 1–24.
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Lev Academic Center,
P.O.B 16031, Jerusalem 9116001, Israel
E-mail address : nowik@jct.ac.il
Department of Mathematics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel
E-mail address : tahl@math.biu.ac.il
URL: www.math.biu.ac.il/~tahl
